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I. INTRODUCTION
Qui tam, or standing in the shoes of the king, is an old occupation but
never before has it been so profitable. A qui tam suit is one brought by a
person who prosecutes a suit for the king as well as for himself.'
Federal qui tam suits are brought under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 2
which provides penalties for one who knowingly presents a false claim to the
government, and also offers incentives to whistleblowers who expose the
false claims. In the ten years since the passage of the 1986 Amendments to
the FCA, both the number of cases and the size of the awards have skyrock-
eted. Even the Internet responds with thousands of "hits" when search
words such as "qui tam" and "whistleblower" are entered. The reason for
the increasing interest in qui tam litigation becomes obvious with a quick
calculation. Using the penalty of $10,000 for each fraudulent act, one
determines that 100 proven transgressions yields a penalty of $1,000,000. In
addition, treble damages are awarded except under certain conditions, stated
in the statute, in which cooperation by the defendant reduces the penalties to
only double the damages as well as reasonable costs and attorney fees.
At the end of 1995, the government reported the following informa-
tion:
3
Qui Tam filings by Fiscal Year:
FY87 33 cases
FY 88 60 cases
FY 89 95 cases
FY 90 82 cases
FY 91 90 cases
FY 92 119 cases
FY 93 131 cases
FY 94 221 cases
FY 95 274 cases
Qui Tam Recoveries (approximately):
FY 88 $2 million
FY 89 $32 million
1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES III "160.
2. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
3. Arent Fox (visited Jan. 1, 1997) <http://www.arentfox.com/features/quitam/quitam.
staLhtml>.
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FY 90 $40 million
FY 91 $36 million
FY 92 $124 million
FY 93 $193 million
FY 94 $379 million
FY 95 $243 million
Total fraud recovery from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 1995
totaled $3,342,390,684,4 of which approximately one-third was from qui tam
actions. The lure of qui tam actions appears to be irresistible.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF Qui TAM
The concept of qui tam can be traced to at least the thirteenth century
where the process allowed one to gain access to the royal courts.5 Although
there were several laws dating back to 1790 in the United States authorizing
suits by private informers who would share in a percentage of the govern-
ment's recovery,6 the FCA first became a viable and profitable action under
Abraham Lincoln.7 Rampant fraud was being committed against the gov-
ernment during the Civil War. In 1861, for example, Grant testified about
the inoperable rifles he found when he took over command in Cairo, Illi-
nois,8 and further testimony was given in the debates preceding the passing
of the act regarding spoiled food and the fact that the same horses were sold
over and over again to the government. This fraud increased both the cost of
the war and the suffering of the Union soldiers, as well as seriously ham-
pered the war effort. The government needed public help to stop these
actions since many government officials were apparently involved in
perpetrating the fraud.9 At that time, the damages assessed against the qui
tam defendant were taxed at twice the damage suffered by the government
4. Arent Fox (visited Feb. 4, 1997) <http://www.arentfox.comfeatures/quitamquitam.
stat.html>.
5. BLAcKsToNE, supra note 1, at *160.
6. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 101, 102; Act of July 5, 1790, ch. 25,
§1, 1 Stat. 129; Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 4, 1 Stat. 131; 133, Act of July 22, 1790, ch.
33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137, 137-38.
7. 31 Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
8. Phillips & Cohen (visited Sept. 20, 1996) <http://www.whistleblowers.com>.
9. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952-58 (1863) (quoted in 67 Nw. U. L. REV.
446,453 n. 82).
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plus a $2,000 penalty per incident with the relator getting fifty percent of the
recovery.
1°
Although fondly known as the Lincoln Law, the FCA remained fairly
inactive until the 1930s and 1940s when individuals began to use informa-
tion obtained from public records as the basis for qui tam actions. These
parasitic suits did not bring new information to the government but relied on
information the government already had as the basis for the recovery claimed
by the relator. The high point of these actions, or low point depending on
your point of view, was the case of United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess"
where the relator obtained all his information from the public record and
alleged false claims presented by a contractor. Although the question of the
relator's share in that case went to the Supreme Court, the law was clear that
there was no restraint on the relator's source of information. Specifically,
the relator was not required to be an original source of information, and
Marcus got his statuary percentage of the recovery. Congress changed the
law to eliminate these parasitic cases, but the amended statute had a chilling
effect on further cases. The costs of pursuing discovery in qui tam cases was
high, and few attorneys were willing to risk representation of a qui tam
plaintiff under that form of the law. The Senate Report for the 1986
amendments restates the Senate version of the 1943 amendments
"specifically provided that jurisdiction would be barred on qui tam suits
based on information in the possession of the Government unless the relator
was the original source of that information."' 2 But inexplicably these terms
failed to make the final version of the Amendment. Even though these
restrictive terms were not in the 1943 act, courts interpreted the Act in the
light of the Senate Report. In United States ex rel. State of Wisconsin v.
Dean,13 the State of Wisconsin was denied the right to maintain its position
as relator in a matter of Medicaid fraud because it had already told its tale to
the United States government as part of its reporting process. In the mid-
1980s, the country once more found itself facing rampant fraud and was in
need of assistance from its citizenry so that it was necessary to amend the
relevant statutes. Congress did not feel that Dean represented its true
attitude toward qui tam suits.
10. 31 Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
11. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
12. S. REP. No. 345, at 12, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Inexplicably this clause was
eliminated from the final 1943 amendments.
13. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 21:869
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In order to encourage qui tam suits, the 1986 amended statute allows
persons who are the original source of the government's information to bring
suit even though some of the information may have been available in the
public record. If there has been previous public disclosure, anyone who is
not an original source is proscribed from bringing suit and the case will be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As the court in Wang ex
rel. United States v. FMC Corp.14 stated: "Qui tam suits are meant to
encourage insiders privy to a fraud on the Government to blow the whistle
on the crime. In such a scheme, there is little point in rewarding a second
toot."'15 The court goes on to state:
Anyone who helped to report the allegation to either the
[G]overnment or the media would have "indirectly" helped to pub-
licly disclose it. If, however, someone republishes an allegation
that already has been publicly disclosed, he cannot bring a qui tam
suit, even if he had "direct and independent knowledge" of the
fraud. He is no "whistleblower." A "whistleblower" sounds the
alarm; he does not echo it.16
The Amendments of 198617 provided more opportunity for the whistle-
blower to obtain a recovery and yet presented certain restrictions which
provided the government some degree of protection from parasitic suits. The
1986 amendments were "aimed at correcting restrictive interpretations of the
act's ... qui tam.., provisions."18 As the court later said in United States
ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.,19 "[o]ne must have been a source to
the entity that first publicly disclosed the information on which a suit is
based." As the court stated in Wang, "[tihe history of the False Claims Act
and the legislative history of its most recent amendment make clear that qui
tam jurisdiction was meant to extend only to those who had played a part in
publicly disclosing the allegations and information on which their suits were
based.'
14. 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
15. Id. at 1419.
16. Id.
17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.
18. Act of October 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat. 3153)
5266, 5269 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733).
19. 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990).
20. Id at 17.
21. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418.
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The 1994 Amendments excluded suits which relate to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 replacing the reference in the 1986 Amendments to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. An interesting discussion of the history
of the early years of the FCA appears in a number of places,2 2 as well as on
an increasing number of web sites.23
Il-. THE STATUTES
The FCA is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.24 Because of its
nature in controlling discovery and investigation of the case, 31 U.S.C. §
3733 will not be included in this paper.
22. Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool for the Private Litigant in
Public Actions, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 446 (1972); JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui
TAM AcTiONS (1993) (updated 1995, 1997); JAMES B. HELMER, JR. ET AL., FALSE CLAIMS AcT
(1994).
23. See, e.g., Taxpayers Against Fraud, The False Claims Act Legal Center (visited Feb.
2, 1997) <http://www.taf.org>; Whistleblowers' Web Site, About Phillips & Cohen (visited
Sept. 2, 1997) <http://www.whistleblowers. com>.
24. These specific sections provide:
§ 3729 False Claims
(a) L.ABI.rrY FOR CERTAIN Acrs.-Any person who-
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee
of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States a false and fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent
claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be
used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully
to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the
amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property
used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Govern-
ment, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the infor-
mation on the receipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public
property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the
Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the Government,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than
$5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which
the Government sustains because of the act of that person, except that if the court
finds that-
[Vol. 21:869
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(A) the person committing the violation of this subsection furnished offi-
cials of the United States responsible for investigating false claims violations
with all information known to such person about the violation within 30 days
after the date on which the defendant first obtained the information;
(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of
such violation; and
(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the informa-
tion about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative
action had commenced under this title with respect to such violation, and the
person did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation into
such violation;
the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of the person. A person violating this
subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a
civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.
(b) KNOWING AND KNOWINGLY DERND.-For purposes of this section, the
terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to informa-
tion-
(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,
and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.
(c) CLAIM DEFIED.-For purposes of this section, "claim" includes any re-
quest or demand, whether under a contact or otherwise, for money or property
which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States
Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or
demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or de-
manded.
(d) ExEM'TION FROM DiscLoSuRE.-Any information furnished pursuant to
subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a) shall be exempt from disclosure
under section 552 of title 5.
(e) EXCLUSION.-This section does not apply to claims, records, or state-
ments made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
§ 3730. Civil actions for false claims
(a) RoSPONSIBIMEs OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL-The Attorney General
diligently shall investigate a violation under section 3729. If the Attorney Gen-
eral finds that a person has violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney
General may bring a civil action under this section against the person.
(b) AcrIONS BY PRIVATE PERSONS.-(l) A person may bring a civil action for
a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government.
The action shall be brought in the name of the Government. The action may be
dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the
dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
(2) A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all mate-
rial evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Gov-
ernment pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days,
and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders. The Govern-
Burke
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ment may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60 days after it
receives both the complaint and the material evidence and infoimation.
(3) The Government may, for good cause shown, move the court for exten-
sions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph
(2). Any such motions may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in
camera. The defendant shall not be required to respond to any complaint filed
under this section until 20 days after the complaint is unsealed and served upon
the defendant pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(4) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions obtained
under paragraph (3), the Government shall-
(A) proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be conducted
by the Government; or
(B) notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case
the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action.
(5) When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other
than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action.
(c) RICHTrs oF THE PARTIES TO Qtn TAM ACIoNs.--(1) If the Government
proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting
the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the person bringing the action.
Such person shall have the right to continue as a party to the action, subject to
the limitations set forth in paragraph (2).
(2)(A) The Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objec-
tions of the person initiating the action if the person has been notified by the
Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person
with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.
(B) The Government may settle the action with the defendant notwith-
standing the objections of the person initiating the action if the court determines,
after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable un-
der all the circumstances. Upon a showing of good cause, such hearing may be
held in camera.
(C) Upon a showing by the Government that unrestricted participation
during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action would in-
terfere with or unduly delay the Government's prosecution of the case, or would
be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment, the court may, in its dis-
cretion, impose limitations on the person's participation, such as-
(i) limiting the number of witnesses the person may call;
(ii) limiting the length of the testimony of such witnesses;
(iii) limiting the person's cross-examination of witnesses; or
(iv) otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the litigation.
(D) Upon a showing by the defendant that unrestricted participation dur-
ing the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action would be for
purposes of harassment or would cause the defendant undue burden or unneces-
sary expense, the court may limit the participation by the person in the litigation.
(3) If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the person who
initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action. If the Government
so requests, it shall be served with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and
shall be supplied with copies of all deposition transcripts (at the Government's
expense). When a person proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the
status and rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the
Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.
[Vol. 21:869
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(4) Whether or not the Government proceeds with the action, upon a
showing by the Government that certain actions of discovery by the person initi-
ating the action would interfere with the Government's investigation or prosecu-
tion of a criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts, the court may stay
such discovery for a period of not more than 60 days. Such a showing shall be
conducted in camera. The court may extend the 60-day period upon a further
showing in camera that the Government has pursued the criminal or civil investi-
gation or proceedings with reasonable diligence and any proposed discovery in
the civil action will interfere with the ongoing criminal or civil investigation or
proceedings.
(5) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Government may elect to pursue its
claim through any alternate remedy available to the Government, including any
administrative proceeding to determine a civil money penalty. If any such alter-
nate remedy is pursued in another proceeding, the person initiating the action
shall have the same rights in such proceeding as such person would have had if
the action had continued under this section. Any finding of fact or conclusion of
law made in such other proceeding that has become final shall be conclusive on
all parties to an action under this section. For purposes of the preceding sentence,
a finding or conclusion is final if it has been finally determined on appeal to the
appropriate court of the United States, if all time for filing such an appeal with
respect to the finding or conclusion has expired, or if the finding or conclusion is
not subject to judicial review.
(d) AWARD TO Qui TAM PLAnnTi.-(1) If the Government proceeds with
an action brought by a person under subsection (b), such person shall, subject to
the second sentence of this paragraph, receive at least 15 percent but not more
than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depend-
ing upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecu-
tion of the action. Where the action is one which the court finds to be based pri-
marily on disclosures of specific information (other than information provided by
the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Gov-
ernment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
news media, the court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no
case more than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into account the significance of
the information and the role of the person bringing the action in advancing the
case to litigation. Any payment to a person under the first or second sentence of
this paragraph shall be made from the proceeds. Any such person shall also re-
ceive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been nec-
essarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. All such expenses,
fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.
(2) If the Government does not proceed with an action under this section,
the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount which
the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages. The
amount shall be not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the
proceeds of the action or settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds. Such
person shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court
finds to havebeen necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.
(3) Whether or not the Government proceeds with the action, if the court
finds that the action was brought by a person who planned and initiated the vio-
lation of section 3729 upon which the action was brought, then the court may, to
Burke
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the extent the court considers appropriate, reduce the share of the proceeds of the
action which the person would otherwise receive under paragraph (1) or (2) of
this subsection, taking into account the role of that person in advancing the case
to litigation and any relevant circumstances pertaining to the violation. If the per-
son bringing the action is convicted of criminal conduct arising from his or her
role in the violation of section 3729, that person shall be dismissed from the civil
action and shall not receive any share of the proceeds of the action. Such dis-
missal shall not prejudice the right of the United States to continue the action,
represented by the Department of Justice.
(4) If the Government does not proceed with the action and the person
bringing the action conducts the action, the court may award to the defendant its
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses if the defendant prevails in the action
and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly
frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment.
(e) CERTAIN ACrIONS BARRED.-(1) No court shall have jurisdiction over an
action brought by a former or present member of the armed forces under subsec-
tion (b) of this section against a member of the armed forces arising out of such
person's service in the armed forces.
(2)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under sub-
section (b) against a Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior
executive branch official if the action is based on evidence or information known
to the Government when the action was brought.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "senior executive branch official"
means any officer or employee listed in paragraphs (1) through (8) of section
101(f) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.).
(3) In no event may a person bring an action under subsection (b) which is
based upon allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an
administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is al-
ready a party.
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Govern-
ment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bring-
ing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the alle-
gations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern-
ment before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.
(f) GOVERNMENT NOT LIABLE FOR CERTAIN ExPENSE.-The Government is
not liable for expenses which a person incurs in bringing an action under this
section.
(g) FEES AND EXPENSES TO PREVAING DEFENDANT.-In civil actions
brought under this section by the United States, the provisions of section 2412(d)
of title 28 shall apply.
(h) Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, har-
assed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions
of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the em-
ployee on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an action under this
section, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in
an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief nec-
[Vol. 21:869
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IV. THE FORM OF THE LITIGATION
Presently, qui tam actions may entitle whistleblowers to receive part of
the damages and penalties awarded to the government by filing suit on
essary to make the employee whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with
the same seniority status such employee would have had but for the discrimina-
tion, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation
for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including liti-
gation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. An employee may bring an action in
the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided in this
subsection.
§ 3731. False claims procedure
(a) A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a trial or hearing
conducted under section 3730 of this title may be served at any place in the
United States.
(b) A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought-
(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729
is committed, or
(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action
are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United
States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event
more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed,
whichever occurs last.
(c) In any action brought under section 3730, the United States shall be re-
quired to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages,
by a preponderance of the evidence.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, or the Federal Rules of Evidence, a final judgment rendered in fa-
vor of the United States in any criminal proceeding charging fraud or false state-
ments, whether upon a verdict after trial or upon a plea of guilty or nolo conten-
dere, shall estop the defendant from denying the essential elements of the offense
in any action which involves the same transaction as in the criminal proceeding
and which is brought under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730.
§ 3732. False claims jurisdiction
(a) ACrIONS UNDER SECION 3730.-Any action under 3730 may be brought
in any judicial district in which the defendant or, in the case of multiple defen-
dants, any one defendant can be found, resides, transacts business, or in which
any act proscribed by section 3729 occurred. A summons as required by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be issued by the appropriate district court
and served at any place within or outside the United States.
(b) CLAIMS UNDER STATE LAw.-The district courts shall have jurisdiction
over any action brought under the laws of any State for the recovery of funds
paid by a State or local government if the action arises from the same transaction
or occurrence as an action brought under section 3730.
§ 3733. Civil investigative demands (The text of this section is not included in
this paper).
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (footnotes omitted).
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behalf of the government 25 and may also receive damages and penalties for
themselves if they have been damaged by the blowing of the whistle.26 For
the remainder of this paper, the qui tam plaintiff shall be designated as "he"
although it is equally probable that the party be a female as a male. If the
government chooses not to intervene, the litigation may be pursued directly
by the whistleblower in which case he will get a larger percentage of the
government damages.27
The process of the suit is statutorily controlled.28 The relator must first
inform the government of the information he has obtained concerning the
fraudulent actions of the defendant. He must be an "original source" of this
information29 if the information has already been placed in the public
record.30 The statute is very specific about what constitutes public disclo-
sure. 3 ' The concept of original source is the key factor in commencing a qui
tam suit if enough of the information has been publicly disclosed. The issue
of whether a government employee can bring a suit has also been litigated.
The relator files the suit under seal on behalf of the government and
himself. The complaint remains under seal for a period of sixty days while
the government investigates the case and determines whether it will inter-
vene.32 The government may ask the court to extend this period of time, but
it has to present a well-founded argument for this extension. 33 If the gov-
ernment decides not to intervene initially, it may only intervene at a later
date upon the showing of good cause to the court.3 4 If the government
chooses to initially intervene, it will carry the case forward itself, "and shall
not be bound by an act of the person bringing the action. 35 If the govern-
ment intervenes, the relator will receive between 15% and 25% of the
recovery as determined by statute. 36 If the government does not choose to
intervene, the relator may continue the case on his own and receive between
25% and 30% of the recovery.37 Pursuant to statute, the government is not
25. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
26. Id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
27. Id.
28. Id. §§ 3730, 3733.
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
30. Id. § 3730(2) 4A, 4B.
31. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
32. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
33. Id. § 3730(b)(3).
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
35. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
36. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
37. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
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responsible for the relator's costs of the suit whether or not it intervenes.
The government also cannot simply step back into the case and intervene at
any time and at its own choosing. If the government desires to intervene in
the case at a later date, it must present a very compelling case to the court to
permit such intervention.38 Once the case is initiated, whether or not the
government has intervened, the relator may not generally dismiss the case or
enter into a settlement with the defendant without the government's agree-
ment. However, the court may approve the settlement agreement or the
dismissal if it is shown that the relator has carried out the case in good faith
39
and that the settlement is fair or the dismissal legally sufficient. In general,
however, once the complaint is filed it may only be dismissed by the consent
of the court and the attorney general.4° In United States v. Griswald,4" the
relator, called the prosecutor at the time, B.I. Dowell, objected when the
government tried to accept a token amount of money and a piece of land in
satisfaction of a much larger judgment.42 It was held that if a settlement is
reached which is approved by the parties and the court, the government
cannot accept a lesser settlement for the relator's share. The relator's share
is vested when the judgment is entered.
In a recent case of first impression, the court in United States ex reL
Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co.,43 considered the
conditions upon which the relator was entitled to a hearing if the government
moved to dismiss the suit whether or not the government had intervened.
The court said that if the finding can be made that the government's decision
to dismiss is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose and that
dismissal is not arbitrary, fraudulent, or illegal, the inquiry is at an end.
44
The court then applied this standard to the facts of the case to determine if
the government had presented'a "facially satisfactory" basis for dismissal or
whether Sequoia had shown a "substantial and particularized need" by
"challenging the legitimacy of the asserted Governmental interest," or by
"pointing to facts that indicated the claimed interest is pretextual," or "that
dismissal is fraudulent," or if it appears that dismissal does not rationally
38. Id. § 3730 (c)(3).
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(2)(A)-(B).
40. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pedicone v. Mazak Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.
Ohio 1992).
41. 24F. 361 (D. Or. 1885).
42. Id. at 366.
43. 912 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
44. Id. at 1338.
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advance the asserted interest. 45 In the end, the court found that Sequoia had
made a "colorable claim" and ordered a hearing at which the government
would have to demonstrate a valid governmental interest. Then the relator
would have to present evidence that dismissal is arbitrary, fraudulent, or
illegal.46
Along with the complaint, the relator provides the government with a
disclosure document which is not filed and is maintained under seal. This
disclosure document is generally kept from the defendant and may be
considered to be work product. In the disclosure document, the relator
presents all of the information he has so that the government can understand
the nature of the claim. It is not necessary that the relator know "everything"
about the evidence at this initial stage but enough information must be
presented so that the government can carry out its own investigation. Mere
allegations without some underlying evidence will not meet the pleading
criteria. In Mikes v. Strauss47 the court stated:
[T]he Court never expected plaintiff to be able to detail every as-
pect of defendants' alleged fraudulent scheme prior to conducting
any discovery. Instead, the primary concern of the Court was to
prevent plaintiff from conducting a fishing expedition through the
intricacies of defendants' business in the hopes of uncovering some
unlawful conduct on which to base the instant action.
48
As may be expected, qui tam cases are expensive and lengthy to litigate.
If they survive motions to dismiss, summary judgment, and judgment on the
pleadings, they may settle rather than be litigated.
V. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the courts to hear a qui tam case is determined by
statute.49 Several states have passed their own qui tam legislation including
California and Florida. The federal court has jurisdiction if state claims
involve false claims which were perpetrated on the federal government.
Since the defendant is often a corporation which transacts business in many
locations, the relator often has the option of choosing a location convenient
45. Id. at 1346.
46. Id. at 1347.
47. 889 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
48. Id. at 751.
49. 31 U.S.C. § 3732.
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for him or his attorney. Subject matter jurisdiction will be discussed under
the topic "Relator".
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The statute of limitations is either six years from the date on which the
violations of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 is committed, or
three years after the date when facts material to the right of action
are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of
the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circum-
stances, but in no event more thai ten years after the date on which
the violation is committed, whichever occurs last as imposed by 31
U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1). 50
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A standard defense posed by a number of defendants in qui tam actions
is an attack on the constitutionality of the FCA. This defense has failed in a
number of different courts but for different reasons.
A. Standing
The question of standing of the relator is but one aspect of the uncon-
stitutionality argument. In a claim filed under 31 U.S.C. § 3729, it is the
United States government which has suffered injury, not the relator, al-
though the relator may have separate claims under section 3730(h). As the
Court held in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,s' to have standing
under Article III of the Constitution, the plaintiff must show an actual or
threatened injury that can be redressed by the judgment requested. In
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,5 2 the Court found that
the injury must be concrete.5 If the government chooses to intervene, the
question of standing is overcome but if the government does not choose to
intervene then the standing of the relator is not so clear. There is a substan-
tial body of case law which holds that individuals cannot bring an action
against the executive branch without a showing of injury on the part of the
50. Id. § 3731(b).
51. 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
52. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
53. Id. at 209.
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plaintiff.54 As the Court stated in Warth v. Seldin,55 unless the plaintiff has
an "interest" because he suffered an injury, he might not pursue the litigation
vigorously.56 Faced with an impressive history of cases, the courts involved
have sought to deny the motion to dismiss for lack of standing but for
apparently conflicting reasons. The Court in Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 7 held that
there was a historical basis for finding standing.58 The court in United States
ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopers, Inc.59 found standing for the relator
based on a history of courts finding standing for the relator.60 Although this
appears to be circular reasoning, it is apparent that the Hughes court wanted
to find standing. In addition, Hughes found that the statutory bounty gave
the relator a personal stake and thus created injury in fact.6 ' The court also
recognized standing since the relator was usually an employee who had
suffered possible termination or other job harassment because of the suit.
The relator normally suffers personal injuries since the relator may lose his
job or be prosecuted and therefore the action creates an injury in fact for the
relator.62 Alternatively, the court in United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua
Engineering63 did not find the historical basis postulated by the other courts,
but did find there were potential ramifications to the employment status of
the relators. 64 In United States ex rel. Truong v. Northrop Corp.,65 the court
dismissed the theories of the other two courts, stating that since most of the
cases which formed the historical basis occurred before the modem theory of
"standing," the historical basis for standing was not viable. It also viewed
any ramifications as to employment as "speculating harm." It found the
basis for standing lay in the injury to the United States government in whose
54. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v.
American United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
55. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
56. Id. at 498-99.
57. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
58. Id. at 488-89 n.24.
59. 714 F. Supp. 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
60. Id. at 1096.
61. Id. at 1098.
62. Id. at 1099.
63. 803 F. Supp. 115 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
64. Id. at 119.
65. 728 F. Supp. 615 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
[Vol. 21:869
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/3
Burke
name the suit had been brought.6 This was a simple and direct conclusion
to a problem that had been troubling the courts.
A related issue is whether the claim is made against the United States if
the false claim was actually made against a state which receives funding
from the federal government for a particular project. The court in United
States v. Azzarelli Construction Co.67 held that since the federal highway
program gave a set amount of money to the state and did not deal directly
with contractors, unlike, for example, open-ended money disbursement
programs such as Medicare, the federal government did not suffer any
injuries from the alleged bid-rigging and a qui tam action could not be
brought.68 Responding to Azzarelli, Congress, in passing the 1986 Amend-
ments, enacted 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c), which includes in the definition of a
"claim" requests for funds made to a grantee or recipient of federal funds so
long as the United States government has provided any of the money which
is requested from the grantee. As the court in Wilkins ex rel. United States v.
Ohio69 noted, "[t]he definition makes no distinction between money pro-
vided as a fixed sum and money provided under an open-ended program, but
rather is broad enough to include any request for money which was origi-
nally obtained from the United States government." 70 A relator, therefore,
may have standing based on government's funding of state projects even
though the false claims were submitted to the state rather than directly to the
federal government.
B. Separation of Powers
The Truong court also addressed the issue of dismissal of the action
based on Northrop's claim that the FCA violated the doctrine of separation
of powers by unconstitutionally undermining the authority of the executive
branch but the court rejected this claim. 71 The court looked to the case of
Morrison v. Olson72 which addressed a similar issue regarding a separation
of powers challenge to the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978.73 That act created a "Special Division" of the
66. Id.
67. 647 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1981).
68. Id. at 761.
69. 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
70. Id. at 1062-63.
71. 728 F. Supp. at 620-21.
72. 487 U.S. 654 (1988), remanded and aff'd, 857 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
73. Id. at 659.
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Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which was empow-
ered to appoint an independent counsel and define his prosecutorial jurisdic-
tion.74 Paralleling the Morrison Court's reasoning, the Truong court ana-
lyzed various phases of the litigation, more specifically Phase One: Initiat-
ing the Suit;75 Phase Two: Conducting the Litigation; 76 and Phase Three:
Terminating the Litigation,77 and stated that:
In sum, the False Claims Act grants the executive branch greater
litigative control than that provided for in the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, which the Supreme Court validated in Morrison v. Ol-
son. Accordingly, defendant's constitutional challenge based on
the separation of powers doctrine will not lie. 78
C. The Appointments Clause
In Truong, the defendant also raised a constitutional challenge based on
a violation of the Appointments Clause, by allowing government litigation to
be conducted by individuals who are not appointed in one of the ways
enunciated in the Appointments Clause and thus are not "officers" of the
United States.79 The Truong court looked to distinguish the case in point
from the holding of the Court in Buckley v. Valeo80 which held that "[s]uch
functions may be discharged only by persons who are 'Officers of the United
States' within the language of [the Appointments Clause].",81 The Truong
court agreed that the "relators" were not "officers" within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause,82 further stating that "[t]hey enjoy limited powers,
have no formal duties, hold no established office, have no prescribed tenure,
and receive no federal emoluments. As such, they are more appropriately
classified as 'agents' for Appointments Clause purposes. '8 3 The Truong
74. Id. at 661.
75. Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 621.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 622.
78. Id
79. Id. at 622-23.
80. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
81. Id at 140 (alteration in original).
82. Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 623.
83. Id. See also Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (stating that the
"position is without tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties, and he acts
only occasionally and temporarily. Therefore, he is not an 'officer,' within the meaning of the
clause of the [C]onstitution referred to.").
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court distinguished the Buckley case on the basis that the Buckley court was
concerned that Congress, through its appointments, was encroaching
impermissibly on executive branch functions84 and "[t]he Supreme
Court... struck down what it regarded as congressional attempts to enlarge
the legislative authority at the expense of that of the Executive Branch."85
But in a qui tam suit, the relator is a private person, in no way linked to
Congress or the judicial branch.86 The court pointed out that "[l]ower courts
have, moreover, limited the potential reach of Buckley, finding the case
inapplicable to private parties." 87 The Troung court then found that "as long
as private participation is not a subterfuge for Congressional control, the
executive branch's Article II responsibility to execute the laws faithfully is
not threatened. Accordingly, defendant's challenge based on the Appoint-
ments Clause cannot survive here."
88
D. Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment provides that "nor shall any person be subject to
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."89 In a case
under the FCA, a civil qui tam case is stayed pending the criminal trial of the
defendant and, not only is the matter resjudicata if the party is found guilty,
but the defendant is also considered to have been found guilty for purposes
of the civil trial if he has plead nolo contendere, and the civil trial proceeds
only to determine damages. 90 The issue of double jeopardy arose in United
States v. Halper.91 Halper had already been convicted and sentenced to two
years imprisonment and fined $5,000 for submitting sixty-five false claims
for Medicare reimbursement. These claims had been submitted for $12
rather than the correct $3, resulting in a government loss of $585. The
government sought a penalty of $2,000 per claim (the statutory penalty at
that time) or $130,000. The Supreme Court ruled in the face of such a large
fine and small loss, that a defendant who had already been punished in a
criminal case could only receive a second civil sanction if that could be
84. Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 623.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 623. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F.
Supp. 620, 624 (D. Md. 1987); see also NRDC v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801,
816 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
88. Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 624.
89. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
90. United States v. Nardone, 782 F. Supp. 996 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
91. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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characterized as remedial.92 The Court also presented standards to use in
determining if that sanction was remedial, which included other costs
experienced by the government. 93 The holding in Halper, however, applies
only to a case in which the defendant has already been tried in a criminal
case and received some punishment.
E. Unjust and Unusual Punishment
Another issue is the question of the amount of fines imposed by the
statute which may be said to infringe on the defendant's constitutional rights
under the Eighth Amendment. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 94
This argument can only be made after the case has been tried, the damages
suffered by the government determined, and the penalties assessed. This
will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. As stated above, the
Halper case is only applicable when there has been a related criminal case.
VI. THE RELATOR
The relator qualifies solely by being the provider of the information
which forms the basis of the qui tam suit. It is the relator who brings the
information to the government either prior to the suit or by the actual filing
of the suit itself. If the information has been the subject of public disclosure
and the relator is not the primary provider of information, the court will not
have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.
The FCA95 provides that:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a con-
gressional, administrative, or Government [General] Accounting
Office report, hearing audit, or investigation, or from the news me-
dia, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the per-
son bringing the action is an original source of the information. 96
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the infor-
92. Id. at 450-51.
93. Id. at 451.
94. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e).
96. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
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mation on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily pro-
vided the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section which is based on the information. 97
In Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp.,98 the court held that if
there "has been no 'public disclosure' within the meaning of section
3730(e)(4)(A), there is no need for a qui tam plaintiff to show that he is the
'original source' of the information." 99 As the court stated in United States
ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency,&°° the qui tam plaintiff
need prove his status as an "original source" under section 3730(e)(4)(B)
"only if an exception is sought to the bar of 4(A)."'' 1
The Stinson cases are an example of different rulings coming down on
basically the same set of facts. During discovery in an unrelated action,
which was not a false claims case, Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante,
P.A., a law firm, became aware of alleged fraud being perpetrated by a
number of insurance companies. The firm then filed a series of qui tam suits
against a number of insurance companies with itself as the relator in each
case. The question arose whether the information which was revealed by the
defendant to the plaintiff during depositions in the discovery phase of the
litigation had been "publically disclosed" so that the law firm was proscribed
from bringing a qui tam suit based on it unless the firm could show that it
was an original source. In United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential
Insurance Co.,102 the court found that information revealed in a "hearing" or
deposition taken in discovery was thereby placed into the public domain. 03
The court in United States ex rel. Stinson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Georgia, Inc.1°4 found that information obtained in a deposition was not
based on a public disclosure. 05 The two cases are an interesting compari-
97. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
98. 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 1416.
100. 929 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1991), af'd, 81 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1996).
101. See also United States ex reL Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th
Cir. 1991) (stating that "the district court in Raytheon determined that the government
employee cannot qualify for the 'original source' exception to the jurisdictional bar of section
3730(e)(4)(A). The court here implied that because the government employee is required, as a
condition of employment, to uncover and report fraud, two of the requirements for the
'original source' exception were not met . .
102. 944F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 1160.
104. 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
105. Id. at 1050.
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son. In both cases there was the same relator and information obtained in
approximately the same manner but a very different ruling. In United States
ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn,1°6 the court took a middle
ground between the two previously cited Stinson cases, stating that the
danger of parasitic suits is minimized when discovery is not filed and
therefore is not put into the public record.10 7 The court stated that qui tam
actions are barred only when enough information exists in the public domain
to expose the fraud transaction or the allegation of fraud.'0 8
The court in United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp. '° analyzed the
case law relating to whether the qui tam action survives the death of the
relator." 0 The court quoting several cases"' stated, and the parties agreed,
that the survival of the action depended on whether it was remedial in nature
or penal and that it could be remedial for one plaintiff and penal for another.
It is clear that actions under the FCA are remedial to the government and that
the death of the relator has no effect on the government's claim. The court
went on to find, however, that
a qui tam relator suffers substantial harm and the qui tam provi-
sions of the FCA are intended to remedy that harm. First, a qui tam
relator can suffer severe emotional strain due to the discovery of
his unwilling involvement in fraudulent activity. Moreover, the
actual or potential ramifications on the relator's employment can be
substantial .... Finally, the relator can suffer substantial financial
burdens as a result of the time and expense involved in bringing a
qui tam action. We thus believe that the FCA's qui tam provisions
are intended to redress wrongs suffered by individual relators such
as Williams, rather than the general public.
112
The court continued:
106. 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
107. Id. at 657.
108. Il at 647.
109. 11 F.3d 136 (llth Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 137.
111. See, e.g., Ex Parte Schreiber, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884); Kilgo v. Bowman Transporta-
tion, Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 876 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Wood, 643 F.2d 188, 190-191 (5th Cir.
1980); James v. Home Constr. Co. of Mobile, 621 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 1980); Murphy v.
Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1977).
112. Neher, 11 F.3d at 138.
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The recovery of a qui tam relator is intended to remedy the harm he
suffered in several ways: by distancing the relator from the fraud
and rewarding him for his involvement in the government's fight
against unlawful activity; by compensating the relator for any harm
he suffered with respect to his employment; and by compensating
the relator for the substantial time and expense involved in bringing
a qui tam action.1
13
The court went on to hold that "a relator's qui tam action survives his
death."'
14
IX. DISCOVERY FROM THE GOVERNMENT
Although the relator is acting on behalf of the government, there are
many barriers erected between the government and the relator if the govern-
ment does not intervene in the case. For example, the relator might believe
that obtaining documents from the government to prove the claim for the
government would be simple, as the government certainly wants to have the
claim proven so that it can get its share of the damages and penalties. It
certainly might be considered to be the least the government can do since it
did not intervene and all the costs of the action are being born by the relator.
In fact, the relator and his attorney may find that obtaining documents from
the government is more difficult than obtaining them from the defendants.
For example, the government has a set of elaborate procedures known as
Touhy regulations, which have been derived from United States ex reL
Touhy v. Ragen," 5 by which the government will furnish information and
grant access to government employees in connection with litigation. In
many instances, it may be more difficult for the relator to obtain discovery
materials from the government than from the defendant.
The relator does not have to provide the information to the government
before filing his claim, although generally this is done. In such a case, the
government has certain statutory protection if it has already been investigat-
ing the claim. The government has sixty days to intervene but it may get an
extension if it has a good basis, which may be the continuation of its investi-
gation. During this period, the complaint is under seal. The government
may choose to intervene and carry out the case according to its own deci-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 139.
115. 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
1997]
23
Walsh Burke: Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for Uncle Sam
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
sions. If the relator has not been an original source, in the event that there
has been public disclosure, the relator will not be able to carry on the case
because there will be an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. If the relator
provides valuable information to the government as a direct and original
source, he will then share in the recovery and penalties.
[T]he United States as against the defendants has the right to adopt
as its own what was from the first claimed in its name, unpreju-
diced by any thing the relator may have done or omitted to do; but
as respects the relator the United States must reward him out of the
proceeds if he has really contributed original information in bring-
ing the suit. It is when the United States fails to adopt or prosecute
the suit, and the relator carries it on, that the defendants may raise
an issue with the relator as to the merit of his activity in bringing it,
and on this collateral issue may defeat it utterly.116
X. THE CLAIM
A. What Constitutes a Claim?
While the definition of "claim" lies within the statute itself 1 7 and
includes
any request or demand, whether under a contact or otherwise, for
money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other
recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of
the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the
Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other re-
cipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested
or demanded[,] 18
there still has been considerable litigation regarding the nature of a claim.
The elements of a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729 were outlined by the court
in Wilkins ex rel. United States v. Ohio.1 9
116. United States v. Pittman, 151 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1945).
117. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c).
118. Id.
119. 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
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[1] The elements of a claim under § 3729(a)(1) are: (1) that
the defendant presented or caused to be presented to an agent of the
United States a claim for payment; (2) that the claim was false or
fraudulent; (3) that the defendant knew that the claim was false or
fraudulent; and (4) that the United States suffered damages as a re-
suit.
[2] The elements of a claim under 3729(a)(2) are: (1) that the
defendant made, used, or caused to be made or used, a record or
statement to get a claim against the United States paid or approved;
(2) the record or statement and the claims were false or fraudulent;
(3) the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim
were false or fraudulent; and (4) the United States suffered dam-
ages as a result.
[31 The elements of a claim under § 3729(a)(3) are: (1) that
the defendant knowingly conspired with one or more persons to get
a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid by the United States; (2)
that one or more of the conspirators performed any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy; and (3) that the United States suffered
damages as a result of the false or fraudulent claim.
[4] A claim under § 3729(a)(7) requires proof: (1) that the
defendant made, used, or caused to be used a record or statement to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to the United States; (2)
that the statement or record was false; (3) that the defendant knew
that the statement or record was false; and (4) that the United States
suffered damages as a result.
[5] The knowledge element of the above claims is defined in
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). Under that section,
the terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with re-
spect to information-
(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information,
and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required. 12°
These formulations are most useful in the preparation of a complaint.
120. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1059 (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson v. Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
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B. The Reverse Claim
Among the 1986 amendments, Congress made provisions for what has
been termed the "reverse" claim, in which the defendant allegedly has
reduced a payment owed to the government through some fraudulent means,
rather than submitting a fraudulent claim for payment to the government. 121
This addition to the list of causes of action has greatly increased the range of
qui tam cases filed since 1986.
In Wilkins, the court considered the situation in which the defendant
omits certain information from records so as to reduce the payments owed to
the government. 122 The court concluded that for there to be a "reverse false
claim," the government has to be made aware of the false statement, misrep-
resentation, or misleading omission in some fashion, i.e., there has to be a
"claim.' , 23
C. False Claims or Fraud: The Element of Intent
The amendment created by 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) which removes the
requirement of proof of intent to defraud has made the qui tam cases sub-
stantially easier to prosecute. The courts, however, have drawn a line with
regard to the minimal degree of knowledge that the defendant must have had
of the alleged fraudulent action. 24 Yet the courts are clear that
[m]ere negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient to satisfy the
above standards for knowledge. Rather, defendant must act at least
with "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" of the truth or
falsity of the information.
Although plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge as that term is defined in §3729(b), plaintiff is not re-
quired to prove that the defendant acted with the intent to deceive.
The gist of the violation is not an intent to deceive but the knowing
presentation of a claim, record or statement that is either
"fraudulent" or "false" and the requisite intent is the knowing pres-
entation of what is "known to be false" or "a lie.
' 125
121. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(7).
122. 885 F. Supp. at 1064.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilkins, 885 F. Supp at 1059.
125. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1059; see also Wang, 975 F. 2d at 1420; Hagood, 929 F.2d
at 1421.
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United States ex rel. Stevens v. McGinnis, Inc.126 stands for the proposition
that an omission of information from records which are required to be
maintained may constitute a false statement or record under the FCA, but the
defendant must have knowingly submitted the false claim. As the court
stated in Hagood:
Innocent mistake is a defense to the criminal charge or civil
complaint. So is mere negligence. The statutory definition of
"knowingly" requires at least "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless
disregard." To take advantage of a disputed legal question, as may
have happened here, is to be neither deliberately ignorant nor
recklessly disregardful. 127
Although one may believe that the essence of the qui tam action is fraud in
fact, the legislature, in referencing a "false claim" rather than fraud, has
effectively removed the requirement of proving intent.
D. Must Claims Under the FCA Be Plead with Specificity?
The standard for pleading fraud under the FCA is not Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but a substantially modified version of rule
9(b) based on exceptions which have been identified by several courts.
Durham v. Business Management Associates"28 held that rule (9)(b) must be
read consistently with rule 8 and, thus, must not abrogate the concept of
notice pleading. As the court in Colonial Penn Insurance v. Value Rent-A-
Car, Inc.129 stated: "In Durham, the Eleventh Circuit stated that '[a]lle-
gations of date, time or place satisfy the rule 9(b) requirement that the
circumstances of the alleged fraud must be pleaded with particularity, but
alternative means are also available to satisfy the rule." ' 130 "The Eleventh
Circuit approves this alternative means... ... 13 The purpose of requiring
that fraud be plead with specificity under rule 9(b) is: 1) to put defendants
on notice as to the conduct complained of so that they have sufficient
information to formulate a defense; 2) to protect the defendants from
126. No. C-1-93-442, 1994 WL 799421, *4-8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1994).
127. Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1421; see also Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 751 (S.D.
N.Y. 1995).
128. 847 F.2d 1505 (1lth Cir. 1988).
129. 814 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
130. Id. at 1092 (quoting Durham v. Business Management Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1512
(11th Cir. 1988)).
131. Id. at 1092.
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frivolous suits; 3) to eliminate fraud actions in which all of the facts are
learned through discovery after the complaint is filed; and 4) to protect a
defendant from harm to its goodwill or reputation. 132 The Stinson court has
emphasized that these conditions can be met in other ways. 133 The FCA has
other safeguards against multiplicity of suits. If there has been public
disclosure, the relator must have "'direct and independent knowledge,' that
is, be an 'original source,' of the allegations under section 3730(e)(4)(B)"'
' 34
in order to apply the exception to rule 9(b).1
35
The courts have found that the imposition of a strict enforcement of rule
9(b) would frustrate the purpose of the FCA, therefore courts allow an
exception to the stringent rule so that the qui tam plaintiff can plead infor-
mation which he knows exists but which may only be available to him now
through discovery.' 36 The requirement of pleading fraud with particularity
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes it difficult
for many persons to bring a qui tam suit and frustrates the legislative intent
of the statute.
Furthermore, pleadings cannot generally be based on information and
belief unless the factual information is "peculiarly within the defendant's
knowledge or control."'' 37 In such a case, allegations made on information
and belief are acceptable if the complaint adduces "specific facts supporting
a strong inference of fraud."'' 38 Where, however, this factual information is
peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge or control, rule 9(b)'s require-
ment is relaxed somewhat. 139 "In such a case, pleading on information and
belief is acceptable. ' '14°
The court in United States v. Napco International, Inc.14 1 followed the
court in Bennett v. Berg 42 which held that "[i]n determining the sufficiency
of the pleading, the Court has considered 'such matters as the time, place and
contents of false representations, as well as the identity of the person making
132. United States ex reL Stinson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 755 F. Supp.
1055, 1056-57 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
133. Id. at 1057.
134. Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
135. Id. at 568.
136. United States ex rel. La Valley v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 707 F. Supp. 1351,
1355 (D. Mass. 1988).
137. Stinson, 755 F. Supp. at 1052.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990).
140. Stinson, 755 F. Supp. at 1052.
141. 835 F. Supp. 493 (D. Minn. 1993).
142. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
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the misrepresentation and what was obtained or given up thereby."' 143 The
Court in Leisure Founders, Inc. v. CUC International, Inc.144 stated:
We are not persuaded by Defendants' argument that the allegations
of fraud fail to comport with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b) because they fail to allege fraud with the requisite degree of
particularity. Nor are we convinced that Rule 9(b) bars Plaintiff
from pleading allegations based on "information or belief," where
the subject matter is "peculiarly within the adverse parties' knowl-
edge."1
45
Rule 9(b) requires that "the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall
be stated with particularity," and is to be read together with rule 8.46 A
plaintiff must allege fraud with sufficient particularity to permit "the person
charged with fraud... [to] have a reasonable opportunity to answer the
complaint and adequate information to frame a response."' 47 The court in
Merrill Lynch v. Del Valle148 stated that the allegations must be accompanied
by "'some delineation of the underlying acts and transactions which are
asserted to constitute fraud."' 49
However, pleading on "information and belief' must be done with great
caution. As the court stated in Stinson,
[i]n the usual case, "[t]o pass muster under rule 9(b), the complaint
must allege the time, place, speaker, and sometimes even the con-
tent of the alleged misrepresentation." 'Thus, pleadings generally
cannot be based on information and belief." Where, however, this
factual information is peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge
or control, rule 9(b)'s requirement is relaxed somewhat. In such a
case, pleading on information and belief is acceptable, but on one
condition: the "complaint must adduce specific facts supporting a
strong inference of fraud or it will not satisfy even a relaxed
143. Napco, 835 F. Supp. at 495 (quoting Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1062).
144. 833 F. Supp. 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
145. Id. at 1574 (quoting Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 608 (2d Cir. 1972)). See also
In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 547, 559
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
146. Fink v. National Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 959 (D.C. Cir.1985).
147. In re United States Oil and Gas Litig., No. 83-1702-Al-CIV., 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2217, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1988).
148. 528 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
149. Id. at 149 (quoting duPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615, 630 (D. Del. 1973)). See, e.g.,
Leisure Founders, 833 F. Supp. at 1574.
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pleading standard." ("[E]ven under a nonrestrictive application of
the rule, pleaders must allege that the necessary information lies
within the defendant's control, and then allegations must be ac-
companied by a statement of facts upon which the allegations are
based.") Bald or otherwise conclusory allegations will not suffice.
The "supporting facts on which the belief is founded must be set
forth in the complaint." And the complainant must be able to con-
nect the allegations of fraud to the defendant.15 .
In United States ex rel. Robinson v. Northrop Corp.,151 the court
reaffirmed that "pleadings cannot generally be based on information and
belief unless the factual information is 'peculiarly within the defendant's
knowledge or control.' 1 52 In general, qui tam plaintiffs must meet the who,
what, when, and where pleading requirement for fraud.
153
[I]t is not enough for plaintiffs to allege that "a Northrop engineer"
or "Northrop employees" or "superiors" committed fraudulent acts.
The identification of the employee, or at least a more specific de-
scription of the person, is within plaintiffs' knowledge, and such in-
formation must be provided in the complaint.1M
Most of the allegations ... repetitively refer to unnamed per-
sons at unspecified times, even though the specifics are presumably
known to the plaintiffs. Defendant complains that it has 35,000
employees and cannot reasonably respond in those circumstances.
We agree. 1
55
The question of "when" is another matter which must be met. The
court in NCR Credit Corp. v. Reptron Electronics, Inc.15 6 dismissed a fraud
complaint where the plaintiff made "mere conclusory" allegations, rather
than alleging a specific date, time, name, or quoting specific misstate-
ments.
157
In contrast, in United States v. Napco International, Inc.,' 58 the gov-
ernment survived a motion to dismiss because it detailed each purchase
150. Stinson, 755 F. Supp. at 1052 (citations omitted).
151. 149 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. 111. 1993).
152. Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Ma2 at 146.
156. 155 F.R.D. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
157. Il at 693.
158. 835 F. Supp. 493 (D. Minn. 1993).
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agreement, including the date of each invoice, the invoice number, the
invoice amount, the country from which the materials were obtained, and the
dollar amount spent on each procurement. This is possible when the
government intervenes in the case, but rarely can the qui tam plaintiff offer
such detail in the initial complaint, since he may have already left the
employ of the qui tam defendant and is rarely able to take the required
documents with him. They must, however, give reasonable delineation of
the specifics of the false claims so that exact proof may be obtained through
discovery. Discovery cannot be a complete fishing expedition, nor can the
case be created in whole after the complaint is filed on the basis that the qui
tam plaintiff has a "idea" that something may be occurring.
E. Standard of Proof
The standard of proof in a qui tam suit is by a preponderance of the
evidence.' 59 There are a number of "but for" qui tam cases in which the
government (or the relator) must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the government would not have taken a certain action "but for" the false
claim presented by the defendant. In United States v. First National Bank of
Cicero,1 60 the government had to show that it would not have guaranteed a
Small Business Administration loan but for the actions of the defendants.
The reliance of the government on the false claim must be shown if damages
in addition to penalties are to be awarded.'6
In United States v. Farina,162 it was determined that submitting a bid
based on false information is not a violation of the FCA, although it may
have been fraud. 163 It does become a violation, however, if the bidder wins
the bid and tenders a bill or false claim to the government for the work.
The court in Outlet Communications, Inc. v. King World Productions,
Inc.'64 also addressed this problem.
The court may consider only the pleadings, that is the complaint
and answer, in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings. "[T]he fact allegations of the complaint are to be taken
as true, but those of the answer are taken as true only where and to
the extent that they have not been denied or do not conflict with
159. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 64 F.3d 251,255 (7th Cir. 1995).
160. 957 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1992).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 676 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Fla. 1987).
162. 153 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.J. 1957).
163. Id. at 821-22.
164. 685 F. Supp. 1570 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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those of the complaint." In order to prevail, a motion for judgment
on the pleadings "must be based on the undisputed facts appearing
in all the pleadings."
Furthermore, the court is obliged to scrutinize the complaint,
construed in plaintiff's favor, and to allow it to stand "if plaintiff
might recover under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of the claim."'
165
"[T]he Court is confined to a review of the pleadings, must accept the
pleaded facts as true, and must resolve any factual issues in a manner
favorable to the non moving party."'166 The Colonial Penn court went on to
state that "a claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is
clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.' 1 67
The court in Swerdloff v. Miami National Bank 68 stated:
The posture of the case requires us to consider whether plaintiffs
could prove any set of facts which would permit recovery under the
Act. We make no suggestion as to whether such facts can be
proven in this case. We merely hold that in our view of the law
sufficient facts might possibly be shown under the cause of action
here alleged to permit recovery and defendant was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law at the pleading stage of the proceed-
ing. 16
9
The court in Outlet Communications, Inc. v. King World Productions, Inc.
continued: "In essence, the court must examine the pleadings to determine
whether any set of facts would permit plaintiff to recover as a matter of
law."'
70
165. Id. at 1572 (citations omitted).
166. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1084, 1090 (S.D.
Fla. 1992). See also Quinones v. Durkes, 638 F. Supp. 856, 858 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
167. Colonial Penn, 814 F. Supp. at 1090.
168. 584 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1978).
169. It at60.
170. Outlet Communications, 685 F. Supp. at 1572; see also International Union of Dist.
50 v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 421 F.2d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Security Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1966).
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. The Court held in Conley v. Gibson171 that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. '172 The NCR court went on to say:
The 'reasonable delineation of the underlying acts and transactions'
test should only be applied in those cases where due to the nature
of the litigation, such as securities fraud, it is impossible for the
litigant to have access to the detailed knowledge necessary to oth-
erwise meet the requirement of Rule 9(b). In such case, the strict
requirement of Rule 9(b) is relaxed so that substantial justice can
be done.1
73
The court in Wilkins repeats the statement of the Sixth Circuit, in Michaels
Building Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A.,174 that "the purpose undergirding the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is to provide a defendant fair notice of
the substance of a plaintiff's claim in order that the defendant may prepare a
responsive pleading." 175  The court in Wilkins evaluated the plaintiff's
position in determining that "[t]his is not a case in which a plaintiff com-
pletely unfamiliar with ODOD or OCS had brought a qui tam ac-
tion .... This gives greater weight to plaintiff's representation that records
and documents relevant to his claims will be found in the defendants'
possession."'176 The court in Wilkins also found that because the plaintiff did
not have equal access to the documents he sought, it was an appropriate case
to apply the exception to rule 9(b). 177 "The purpose of harmonizing Rule 8
'notice pleading' requiring only a 'short and plain statement' with the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is to allow that all pleadings be
construed as to do 'substantial justice' as required under Rule 8(f.' 78
171. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). See also Wilkins ex rel. United States. v. Ohio, 885 F. Supp.
1055, 1058 (S.D. Ohio 1995); NCR Credit Corp. v. Reptron Elecs., Inc., 155 F.R.D. 690, 692
(M.D. Fla. 1994).
172. Id. at 45-46.
173. NCR Credit Corp., 155 F.R.D. at 692.
174. 848 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1988).
175. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1060.
176. Id. at 1061.
177. Id.
178. NCR Credit Corp., 155 F.R.D. at 692.
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If the defendant has been convicted in a criminal case on the same facts,
it is collaterally estopped from contesting issues in the qui tam case, how-
ever, the government still has to prove damages.
179
F. Discovery
The Court in Retail Clerks International Ass'n v. Schermerhorn'
80
found that "the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that
fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged."' 8' As the court in
Mikes v. Strauss' 82 states: "The court never expected the plaintiff to be able
to detail every aspect of defendants' alleged fraudulent scheme prior to
conducting any discovery."'183 In Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC
Corp., 8 4 the court expected the plaintiff to conduct discovery to identify the
evidence of the alleged fraud. The court in United States ex rel. LeBlanc v.
Raytheon Co.'"5 found that evidence publicly disclosed for the first time
during the discovery phase of a qui tam suit is not barred from use in that
same suit by section 3730(e)(4)(A). However, if it were barred, qui tam
plaintiffs would have little choice but to waive their right to discovery for
fear of disclosing information that would bar the claims for which they might
wish discovery in the first place.
As previously discussed, there are several cases relating to the law firm
of Stinson Lyons which discovered rampant cheating among insurance
companies while it was conducting discovery against Provident Fire and Life
Insurance Company. The law firm brought qui tam suits both against
Prudential Insurance Co. and against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, but
these courts had different holdings. In United States ex rel. Stinson v. Blue
Cross of Georgia, 18 6 the court dismissed the complaint stating:
To prevail in this suit, Stinson Lyons necessarily would have to en-
gage in massive discovery to begin to substantiate its allegations.
It is precisely this conduct that Rule 9(b) is designed to pre-
179. See, e.g., United States v. Nardone, 782 F. Supp. 996 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
180. 373 U.S. 746 (1963), aff'd, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
181. Id. at 753 n.6. See also Wheeldin v. Wheeldin, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963) (regarding
inferring fact from allegations of complaint); United States ex rel. Kent v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp.
720, 723 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
182. 889 F. Supp. 746, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
183. Id. at 757.
184. 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
185. 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
186. 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
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vent .... There is nothing in the complaint that suggests that all of
the facts needed to support this sanction do not need to be pro-
duced in discovery .... In short, Stinson Lyons still has alleged no
facts that support an inference that BC-GA defrauded anybody.
187
G. Conspiriy
While 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) provides for a false claims action based
on conspiracy, this has rarely been plead successfully. In part, this is based
on the fact that most defendants are corporations rather than individuals. A
corporation cannot conspire with itself, its agents, or employees.1
88
XI. RETALIATION
A claim under section 3730(h) requires proof that: 1) the plaintiff
engaged in lawful protected activity in furtherance of a FCA action; 2) the
plaintiff is an original source; and 3) the plaintiff suffered the harm de-
scribed in the statute because of these actions. 8 9
The "whistleblower" provision of the FCA prevents the harassment,
retaliation, or threatening of employees who assist in or bring qui tam
actions. In particular, the statute provides:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened,
harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms
and conditions of employment by is or her employer because of
lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or oth-
ers in furtherance of an action under this section, including inves-
tigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action
filed or to be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief
necessary to make the employee whole. 190
187. Id. at 1057.
188. See, e.g., Leisure Founders, Inc. v. CUC Int'l Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1562, 1575 (S.D.
Fla. 1993); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1084, 1096 (S.D.
Fla. 1992); Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aft'd, 865 F.2d
1272 (11th Cir. 1988).
189. 31 U.S.C. § 3730.
190. Id.
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Several district courts have held that section 3730(h) protects internal
whistleblowers.191 "To sustain an action under section 3730(h), plaintiff
must prove that: 1) she engaged in conduct protected under the statute; 2)
defendants were aware of her conduct; and 3) she was terminated in retalia-
tion for her conduct.' 92  One element of protected conduct is
"investigation.' 93 As the court indicated in Robertson v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc.,19 4 the qui tam plaintiffs conduct must be conduct protected
under the statute, such as investigating alleged fraud in an effort to bring or
help the government to bring an action under the FCA. The Robertson court
relied in part on the legislative history of the act stating, "[t]he legislative
history makes clear that a 'whistleblower must show the employer had
knowledge the employee engaged in protected activity."
' ' 95
The court in Neal v. Honeywell, Inc.196 explained that the actual filing
of a qui tam suit should not be a prerequisite to protection, and stated that
"we hold that the whistleblower protection provision of the False Claims Act
forbids discrimination against an employee who has made an intracorporate
complaint about fraud against the Government."' 97  Indeed, in Pogue v.
United States Department of Labor,198 the court held that the internal
whistleblower was protected even if no lawsuit was ever filed by the gov-
ernment or by another qui tam informant.'99 In Aiello, the court held that
"[t]he qui tam statute prohibits 'any ... manner [of] discrimination. ' '' 20
191. See, e.g., Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948 (5th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1110 (1995); Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Ill.
1993), aff'd, 33 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Kent v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp.
720, 723 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
192. Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Robertson v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994).
193. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
194. 32F.3d at 951.
195. S. Rep. No. 345 at 35 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5300. See
Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994) (restating Senate
Report No. 345).
196. 826 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
197. Id. at 273. See Aiello, 836 F. Supp. at 724 (discussing Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826
F. Supp. 266 (N.C. Ill. 1993)). See also Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Wilkins ex rel. United States v. Ohio, 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
198. 940 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1991).
199. Id. at 1290.
200. Aiello, 836 F. Supp. at 726 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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The court in Aiello20° also found that the relator was protected even if
the relator was terminated by a later employer because of the influence of the
qui tam defendant on the terminating employer.
The right of a government employee to be a relator has been challenged
in a number of cases. In Wilkins,2°2 the defendant claimed that the plaintiff
was acting on behalf of the state because he was required by his job to
investigate irregularities in the use of federal funds.23 The Wilkins court
found that "[a]n employee can be acting on his own behalf in investigating
matters in furtherance of a qui tam action even though he or she would also
be conducting those same investigations on behalf of the employer." 204 The
court notes "that section 3730(h) applies to employees who engage in lawful
acts on behalf of the employee or others."205  In United States ex rel.
LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co.,2°6 the court found that a government employee
could bring an action under the FCA based upon information obtained while
acting as an employee. But Raytheon also held that a government employee
could not qualify as an original source.207 The Eleventh Circuit in United
States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.2°8 rejected the holding of the First
Circuit in Raytheon stating that the court improperly relied on an "original
source" consideration where there had been no public disclosure.20 9 The
Raytheon court also made a number of public policy arguments against the
employee getting a share of the recovery when he was paid to work for the
government210 which were rejected by both the Williams 211 and Wilkins
courts.2 12
The Williams court dismissed the dubious logic of the concept that a
government employee held a dual status, so by telling himself the informa-
tion, he was, in fact, publicly disclosing it.213 That court also pointed out
that the statute in section 3730(e)(4)(A) enumerates the circumstances in
which information is considered to be publicly disclosed. The statute is very
201. Id. at 724-25.
202. 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
203. Id. at 1065.
204. Id. at 1066.
205. Il (emphasis added) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)).
206. 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
207. Id at 20.
208. 931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
209. Id. at 1500 n.13. See also id. at 1500-01.
210. Raytheon, 913 F.2d at 20.
211. Williams, 932 F.2d at 1500.
212. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1066.
213. Williams, 932 F.2d at 1499.
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specific about the methods of "public disclosure" and does not imply that
these are the only examples of public disclosure. Therefore, a government
employee telling the information to himself does not amount to public
disclosure. In addition, Congress has barred certain actions by specific
government employees and, by being so specific, has indicated that other
government employees can bring such actions if they are not specifically
excluded by the Act and if they meet the other criteria of the Act.214
In order that a relator qualify under a section 3730(h) claim, the
defendant must know that the plaintiff is engaging in protected activity.215 If
the employee is engaging in assigned job activities while investigating and
gathering information relating to the false claim, it may not be apparent to
the employer that such protected activity is taking place.216 It is not neces-
sary that the qui tam action be brought by the protected individual 217 nor is it
necessary that the plaintiff threaten to file such a suit.21 8 Often the plaintiff
has not heard of qui tam causes of action until he goes to an attorney after
being fired because he blew the whistle. It is necessary that the employee
make it known to the employer that he objects to the defrauding of the
government and that he requests the employer to either change its activities
or engage in one of the other activities which are protected under the statute.
"[The] employee must supply sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that the employee was discharged because of activities which
gave the employer reason to believe that the employee was contemplating a
qui tam action against it.'' 219 "Internal whistle-blowing" is sufficient to
evoke the protection of the statute.22
XII. RIGHT TO AMEND COMPLAINT
The plaintiff has a right to amend his complaint at least once to elimi-
nate any deficiencies found by the court. With regard to the right to amend
the complaint, the Eleventh Circuit held, in Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue
214. Id. See also id. at 1503.
215. Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994).
216. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1066.
217. See Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Clemes v. Del Norte
County Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F. Supp 583, 595 (N.D. Cal. 1994); United States ex rel. Kent
v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp. 720, 723-24 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
218. Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 753 (alteration in original).
219. Id.
220. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
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Shield of Florida, Inc., 221 that "Cooper is entitled to one chance to amend the
complaint and bring it into compliance with the rule. "2'2 The court in Griggs
v. Hinds Junior College"m held:
The Federal [R]ules of Civil Procedure provide that 'leave [to
amend the complaint] shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires.' Granting leave to amend is especially appropriate, in cases
such as this, when the trial court has dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim .... We think the refusal to grant leave was
not a valid exercise of the district court's discretion, rather it was
'merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of
the Federal Rules.'
2N
The court in Lockett v. General Finance Loan Co.2 held: "that it was
an abuse of discretion not to grant Lockett's motion to amend the com-
plaint .... ,,226 In Hildebrand v. Honeywell, Inc.227 the court stated that "if
the basis of the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was their
failure to prosecute, we find that the court's ruling was an abuse of discre-
tion."228 The Hildebrand court continued:
Moreover, Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given when
justice so requires. Permission should be denied only if it appears
to a certainty that plaintiffs cannot state a claim showing they are
entitled to relief or defendant will be unduly prejudiced.229
XIII. THE FILED RATE DOCrRNE
There are a number of cases which are categorized by the nature of the
defendant. Utility companies, such as electric and telephone companies,
which are undoubtedly "deep pockets," are controlled by the laws of their
221. 19 F.3d 562 (llth Cir. 1994).
222. Id. at 568-69.
223. 563 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
224. Id. at 179-80 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
225. 623 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1980).
226. Id. at 1132.
227. 622 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1980).
228. Id. at 181.
229. IM. at 182. See also Griggs, 563 F.2d at 180.
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states, generally through a public service commission. The commission
regulates the rates which the utility can charge for its services, these rates
being known as the "filed rates." The "filed rate doctrine" essentially states
that the court does not have the power to change a rate for a utility charge
that has been set by the public service commission or equivalent body of a
state. Only the public service commission can make that change and the
change will be reflected in later rates.
In the en banc opinion of Taffet v. Southern Co. 230 the court stated that
"the filed rate doctrine recognizes that where a legislature has established a
scheme for utility rate-making, the rights of the rate-payer in regard to the
rate he pays are defined by that scheme. 23' In addition, the Tuffet court
pointed out that "federal courts have applied the filed rate doctrine in a
variety of contexts to bar recovery by those who claim injury by virtue of
having paid a filed rate., 232 In Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp.,23 3 the court
held that "[t]he filed rate doctrine bars suits against regulated utilities
grounded on the allegation that the rates charged by the utility are unreason-
able ' 234 and also held that the filed rate doctrine bars Federal RICO and
associated causes of action based upon an alleged scheme by NYNEX to
obtain inflated rates.235 Judge Brandeis's ruling in Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern 236 is quoted by the Wegoland CoUrt.2 37
[T]he legal rights between a regulated industry and its customers
with respect to rates are controlled by and limited to the rates filed
with and approved by the appropriate regulatory agency, and that
any attempt to reassess the reasonableness of rates would require
the judiciary to "reconstitut[e] the whole rate structure" of the in-
dustry.2
3s
The Wegoland court found that the filed rate doctrine is still applicable even
when there are allegations of fraud upon the regulatory agency itself.239
230. 967 F.2d 1483 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
231. Id. at 1490.
232. Id. at 1488.
233. 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994).
234. Id. at 18.
235. Id.
236. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
237. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 19.
238. Id. (quoting Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163).
239. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 22.
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In Sun City Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Citizens Utilities Co.,240 the plaintiffs
claimed that the water and sewer utility perpetrated a complex accounting
fraud that misrepresented to the Association the actual operating costs and
resulted in a large sum of money being paid to the utility. 241 The Second
Circuit once more applied the filed rate doctrine as it had in Wegoland,242
holding that: "(1) legislatively appointed regulatory bodies have institu-
tional competence to address rate-making issues; (2) courts lack the compe-
tence to set utility rates; and (3) the interference of courts in the rate-making
process would subvert the authority of rate-setting bodies and undermine the
regulatory regime." 243
The basis for these decisions is identified by the court in Sun City24 and
is discussed again by the court in Wegoland:
If courts were licensed to enter this process under the guise of
ferreting out fraud in the rate-making process, they would unduly
subvert the regulating agencies' authority and thereby undermine
the stability of the system. For only by determining what would be
a reasonable rate absent the fraud could a court determine the ex-
tent of the damages. And it is this judicial determination of a rea-
sonable rate that the filed rate doctrine forbids. 2A5
While Wegoland involved RICO claims, the filed rate doctrine has been
applied in other actions.
246
The filed rate doctrine is essentially based on public policy. If the court
were to determine that a rate had been set based on false information and
then determine what the rate should have been in order to evaluate damages,
it would be second guessing the Association. Besides having the court
override the Association which set the rate, a factor which is clearly against
public policy pursuant to Wegoland and Sun City, it would also permit the
240. 45 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1995).
241. Id. at 61.
242. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21.
243. Sun City, 45 F.3d at 62. See also H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d
485,490 (8th Cir. 1992).
244. Sun City, 45 F.3d at 62.
245. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21.
246. See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 417
(1986) (antitrust); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1981) (breach of
contract); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 246,
251-53 (1951) (fraud).
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party who brought the suit to get relief, while the parties who were equally
effected but were not involved in the suit do not get relief.
In United States ex rel. John Murray v. Bellsouth Telecommunications,
Inc.,247 the argument that under the FCA there are two possible penalties
assessed against the defendant, triple damages and a fine for each transgres-
sion. The penalty for each transgression remains even if the government has
suffered no damages and therefore there is no need to assess damages for the
assessment of the fine. On the basis of the filed rate doctrine, there can be
no damages as the rate charged is never "wrong" even if it is set because of
alleged fraudulent representations. In addition, in a false claims suit, only
the government and the relator can bring such a suit so there is no inequality
with relation to other rate payers. The court in Murray concluded that:
The FCA also provides for a penalty of between $5,000 and
$10,000 for each violation of the act. The penalty is mandatory.
The Court has been unable to find any legislative history or cases
regarding how a court should determine the exact amount of the
penalty to be imposed for each violation. The Court notes that
"[the] range in the amount of forfeitures apparently represents con-
gressional intent to allow discretion in assessing forfeitures." The
Court concludes that as long as any civil penalty imposed upon the
Defendant is not based upon any consideration of the actual dam-
ages suffered by the Government, then the filed rate doctrine does
not bar the Plaintiff's claim for civil penalties under §3729(a). 48
Although this was only a district court ruling, the argument may prevail
in other cases against publicly regulated defendants and permit qui tam
actions against publically regulated corporations.
XIV. DAMAGES
The FCA provides double or triple recovery for damages suffered by
the United States. The size of the recovery is not only determined by the
damage suffered by the government, but by the manner in which that damage
is measured and the actual number of claims submitted to the government by
the defendant or through an intermediary. There is no standard for measur-
ing damages stated in the statute itself, and often the manner selected by the
247. No. 94-6059 (S.D. Fla. filed January 19, 1994).
248. No. 94-6059, at 6 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 1996) (order denying in part and granting in
part defendant's motion to dismiss) (citations omitted).
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plaintiff depends on the nature of the false claim. The theory of damages is
a complex one, and an analysis of government damages according to
different theories is a prudent exercise for the qui tam litigator.
As a key case, we must look once more to United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess249 where the court established a simple "out of pocket" measure.
How much would the government have paid "but for" the fraudulent actions
of the defendants? The difference between that amount and what they did
pay is the measure of the government damages according to the Hess
Court.20 This method does not include the government's costs related to
investigation of the matter, including costs of delays for substandard prod-
ucts.
In United States v. Bornstein,251 the Court applied the "benefit of the
bargain" approach to calculating damages. "The Government's actual
damages are equal to the difference between the market value of the [item] it
received and retained and the market value that the [item] would have had if
they had been of specified quality. ' ' 2  The Bornstein Court cited United
States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co,253 as a basis for its choice of the benefit
of the bargain approach. Grunstein identified the measure of damages as
"the value of the property which the person defrauded would have received
but for the fraud, less, as a credit, the value of the property which he has in
fact received."5 4
While the Supreme Court in Bornstein used a benefit of the bargain
theory of damages, it did not overturn the "out of pocket" measure applied
by the Marcus Court, which appears to lead the practitioner to believe that
the Court will consider any reasonable method of calculating damages which
will fairly reimburse the government for its losses and expenses without
creating a windfall situation.
Under the FCA, controlling Supreme Court and lower court precedents
hold "that the Government need not show actual damages in order to prove a
violation of the False Claims Act."' 'z 5 In Marcus, electrical contractors
submitted fraudulent bills to the government for work on numerous projects.
249. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
250. Id. at 552.
251. 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
252. Id. at 316 n.13.
253. 137 F. Supp. 197, 205 (D.N.J. 1956).
254. 11 at 205.
255. United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991); see
also Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); United States v. Rohleder, 157 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1946).
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In some instances, the government discovered that the fraud was committed
before payment was made, however, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
District Court held that failure to show actual damage in these instances
would not preclude recovery under the [FCA], ' z 6 and the Supreme Court
went on to affirm the district court.2 7 The Court in Rex Trailer reaffirmed
the holding in Marcus that "there is no requirement, statutory or judicial,
that specific damages be shown .... ,z The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
declared this rule in RohIeder when it stated that the FCA "permits recov-
ery.., thereunder without actual damage being proven." 59 These holdings
are all affirmed by the court in United States v. Kensington Hospital.
260
The question of consequential damages does not appear to be clear at
the present time since the present relevant cases involve the particular facts
of the cases in question.
Even if there are no damages, the FCA provides for penalties per
incident and the question arises as to the method for counting the number of
incidents. For example, in Bornstein, the question arose as to the actual
number of claims submitted and was confused by the fact that the subcon-
tractor had only submitted three false bills to the contractor whereas the
contractor had submitted thirty-five claims to the government. The Born-
stein Court held that the subcontractor would only be held to three claims
since the statute "penalizes a person for his own acts, not for the acts of
someone else. ' 26' Again the question as to the calculation of the number of
claims will have to be taken on a case-by-case basis.
The additional question of the amount of the penalty, whether $5,000 or
$10,000, or a number in between, has not been answered by the courts and
the statute does not provide guidelines. It will be up to each court to assess
the exact amount of consequential damages based on the individual facts of
each case.
256. Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 153 n.5.
257. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 552-53 (1943).
258. Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 152.
259. Rohleder, 157 F.2d at 129.
260. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. at 1128.
261. Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 312.
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XV. TYPES OF RECENT CASES
While it appears that a number of different types of cases could be
brought against qui tam defendants, the cases that bring in the major recov-
ery for plaintiffs fall into certain specific categories:
A) Medicare Fraud 262
B) Defense Contractor Fraud263
C) Environmental Law Compliance2 4
D) Bid rigging with actual false claim265
E) Agricultural Supplements266
F) Overcharging and/or product substitution and/or falsifying
services performed267
It appears that in every instance where the United States pays a bill, is
paid, or where it gives money to a state from which other claims are paid,
that there is the potential for a qui tam suit.
XVI. CONCLUSION
The dramatic increase in the number of qui tam cases in the past few
years, the size of the awards, and the intricacies of the legal questions
regarding qui tam indicate that qui tam is an area of the law that must be
watched closely.
262. See e.g., Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
263. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
264. Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, 916 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
265. United States ex reL Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493 (1lth Cir. 1991).
266. United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F.
Supp. 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (mem.). A reverse false claim was submitted to the government
by commodity handlers who had exceeded their quotas for growing specific fruits and who
were therefore subject to a fine under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and who
submitted false information so that they would not have the fine imposed upon them.
267. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416 (9th Cir. 1991); United States ex reL Kent v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
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